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Review Essay
The Rule of Law(yers)
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS. By William H.
Simon.* Boston: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. viii, 253. $35.00.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. **
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several lawyers and law professors have written books
about the decline of ethical behavior in the legal profession.' They have found
that lawyers are more adversarial, less civil, less honest, less concerned with
justice, and less happy than in the past.2 Associates are less loyal to firms, and
firms are less loyal to associates. 3 Many lawyers lament what the profession has
become. They wonder whether they do a good thing. "Can I be a lawyer and
a good person?" "Do lawyers add to the misery of the world?"
One of the striking things about several of the recent lawyer books is that
their authors are among the most distinguished law professors in the country.4
At one time, legal academics considered the legal profession a rather mundane
subject. But the decline of the profession has captured the attention of many
within the legal academy. Law professors want their students to find a
meaningful life in the law; they want law practice to promote justice. They are
also concerned with whether law professors do a good thing. "Can I be a law
professor and a good person?" "Do law professors add exponentially to the
misery of the world?"
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford
University. J.D. 1974, Harvard.
** Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Pepperdine University. J.D. 1976,
University of Virginia. I would like to thank Tom Shaffer and Mark Scarberry for their
comments on an earlier draft of this essay and Michelle Pirozzi and Stacey Rock for their
research assistance.
1. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); SOLM. LINOwITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION
(1994); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); MIKE
PAPANTONIO, IN SEARCH OF ATrICUs FINCH (1996); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
2. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 31-39, 51-59, 69-91; KRONMAN, supra note
1, at 1-4, 294-300.
3. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 277-88; GLENDON, supra note 1, at 21-28.
4. All of the authors cited supra note 1 are law professors except Mike Papantonio
and Sol Linowitz. Mary Ann Glendon is the Learned Hand Professor at Harvard;
Anthony Kronman is the Dean and Edward J. Phelps Professor at Yale; David Luban is
the Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Ethics at Georgetown; and Thomas Shaffer
is the Robert E. & Marion D. Short Professor Emeritus at Notre Dame.
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William H. Simon's The Practice ofJustice: A Theory ofLawyers' Ethics
is the most recent law professor critique of the profession. Simon argues that the
problem with lawyers is at the heart of what the profession calls on lawyers to
do.5 Under what Simon calls "the Dominant View" of lawyering, lawyers do
whatever is "arguably legal' for clients.6 The representation is, to use a term
common in client counseling circles, "client-centered." 7 The lawyer, in the
words of Murray Schwartz, "[w]hen acting as an advocate for a client... is
neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the
ends achieved."8 As Simon argues, such advocacy is likely to undercut the
search forjustice.9 It may advance the autonomy of clients, but it comes at the
expense of the autonomy of other people. It is likely to advance the autonomy
of those who can afford lawyers at the expense of those who can not.
Many of the recent books on the legal profession look back nostalgically to
the 1950s as a time when the practice of law was more civil and lawyers were
more concerned with justice. 10 Simon harkens back to a different 50s, the
5. Simon suggests that the moral anxiety of lawyers has its roots in:
[A] structural tension in the lawyer's role that has always been present
but has become more acute during the past century. The core of the
explanation is this: the dominant conception of the lawyer's
professional responsibilities weakens the connection between the
practical tasks of lawyering and the values of justice that lawyers
believe provide the moral foundations of their role.
See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 2
(1998).
6. Simon finds the fault in the legal rules and legal ethics commentary that
advocate "the Dominant View": "the lawyer must-or at least may-pursue any goal of
the client through any arguably legal course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal
claim." See SIMON, supra note 5, at 7.
7. I adopt the term "client-centered" from the client-centered legal counselors who
argue that the lawyer's primary concern should be increasing client autonomy and
advancing client interests. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
8. Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability ofLawyers, 66 CAL.
L. REv. 669, 673 (1978).
9. Simon identifies the weaknesses in the arguments for the Dominant View.
Aggressive lawyer advocacy may increase client autonomy, but it tends to do so at the
expense of the autonomy of others. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 26-52. Clients should
not have, in Simon's terms, "A Right to Injustice." See SIMON, supra note 5, at 26. The
"Dominant View" holds that aggressive advocacy will aid courts in the search for truth
and justice, but, as those who have experience with the court system know, lawyer
advocacy often inhibits that search rather than aiding it. There is little evidence
supporting the view that aggressive lawyer advocacy will provide "Justice in the Long
Run." See SIMON, supra note 5, at 53-76.
10. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 35-39; KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 50-51,
277, 283, 294-95. My law professor, Thomas Bergin, who practiced law on Wall Street
in the 1950s, says that in those days, "lawyers were the moral conscience of Wall Street."
[Vol. 65
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1850s.1 He praises the ethical precepts of the authors of the earliest American
lawyer codes, David Hoffinan 2 and George Sharswood. 3 They argued that
lawyers should assume "public responsibility and [exercise] complex normative
judgment."' 4 Sharswood argued that "[c]ounsel have an undoubted right, and are
duty bound, to refuse to be concerned for a plaintiff in the pursuit of a demand,
which offends his sense of what is just and right."'" Simon renews Hoffman's
and Sharswood's call for lawyers to seek justice. He argues that "[l]awyers
should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the
particular case, seem likely to promote justice.""
In a world in which many law professors view law merely as an exercise of
power or a means to efficiency, it is refreshing to hear Simon's call for lawyers
to seekjustice. But a lot has happened in the century and a half since Hoffman
and Sharswood challenged a young country's lawyers. Hoffman's and
Sharswood's voices were pre-modem. They were confident that they knew what
justice was, and they were willing to see that clients pursued it. But today's
"Dominant View" of lawyering is a product of the modem and post-modem eras.
Under liberal notions of lawyering, the lawyer's only concern is to advance the
autonomy of the client; the assumption is that the choices of autonomous
individuals will advance the common good. 7 Post-modernity takes a more
11. Simon cites the activities of David Dudley Field-going from judge to judge
to obtain injunctions on behalf of Jim Fisk and Jay Gould-in 1870 as an example of the
Dominant View of lawyering. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 160-62.
Legal historian Michael Schudson also notes a shift in legal ethics in the middle of
the nineteenth century and also uses David Dudley Field as a primary example of the
shift. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Field was a law reformer, drafting the
Field Code, which was adopted by New York in 1848. In 1870, he was involved in the
scandals arising from his representation of "the notorious James Jay, Jay Gould, and
their Erie Railroad." Schudson argues that "by the 1870s leading American lawyers were
coming to espouse a responsibility to their clients as their primary and even exclusive
moral obligation as lawyers." Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional
Lives: The Correspondence ofDavidDudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 191 (1977), reprinted in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHics 183-85,
315-29 (1985).
12. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 33, 63-64.
13. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 63-64.
14. SIMON, supra note 5, at 63.
15. SIMON, supra note 5, at 63 (quoting GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 39 (2d ed. 1860)).
16. SIMON, supra note 5, at 138.
17. For example, client-centered legal counselors teach that the primary concern
of the lawyer should be to advance the autonomy of the client. See infra notes 103-09
and accompanying text. For some client-centered counselors, this theory is based on a
belief that people will be good if given autonomy. Client-centered counselors Robert
Bastress and Joseph Harbaugh base their client-centered theory on the work of
psychologist Carl Rogers. ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH,
2000]
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skeptical view of human nature, but it has tended to reinforce the "Dominant
View" of lawyering as well. In the post-modem view, no one has a greater claim
to understanding the good than anyone else. The lawyer should not influence the
client because the lawyer's perception of the good is likely to be no better than
that of the client." In response to Simon's call for lawyers to seek justice, our
post-modem era asks the question of philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre: "Whose
Justice?"' 9
Simon's surprising answer is that lawyers should look to the law for their
understanding ofjustice. Justice is to be found in our "legal values."
'Justice' here connotes the basic values of the legal system and
subsumes many layers of more concrete norms. Decisions about
justice are not assertions of personal preferences, nor are they
applications of ordinary morality. They are legal judgments
grounded in the methods and sources of authority of the
professional culture. I use 'justice' interchangeably with 'legal
merit.' 20
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING 57(1990). Bastress and Harbaugh state:
"Rogerians believe humans to be fundamentally good. The helper [lawyer], then, need
only nurture that natural goodness. When individuals feel understood, feel good about
themselves and find acceptance, they will respond rationally and positively, in terms of
their own growth and their relations with others." Id. at 27.
This belief that autonomy will yield moral behavior has its roots in the teachings
of Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, AND
WHAT IS ENLIGTmNMENT? 67-68 (Lewis White Beck trans., 1959). Kant believed that
autonomy not only would lead to morality but that it was also a necessary precondition
to morality. Id. at 59.
18. Some client-centered counselors take a post-modem route to their belief that
the lawyer should focus on client autonomy. The Binder, Bergman, and Price text
advocates client control based on a post-modem lack of confidence in the lawyer's ability
to discern truth. It discourages the lawyer from bringing "your personal values" into the
discussion, and states that "a client whose values differ from yours is not 'wrong.'
DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 283-84 (1991). The quote marks
around "wrong" suggest that wrongness is not a meaningful concept. If lawyers cannot
be confident of their moral values, and clients cannot be wrong, lawyers should defer to
client values.
19. ALASDAIRMACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
20. SIMON, supra note 5, at 138. Simon calls on lawyers to apply contextual
judgment, much like a common law judge. The lawyer would apply contextual standards
to the issues that arise. Simon further states:
Contextual standards are general norms that depend on, and are typically
derived from, the circumstances of particular applications. Since new and
unique cases constantly arise, the answers involve creativity; yet when they
are plausible, they seem to have been implicit in the pre-existing norms. To
the extent that the lawyer shares the relevant public norms, she expresses her
own values as she vindicates the public ones.
[Vol. 65
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I share Simon's belief that lawyers should pursue justice,2 but in this essay,
I discuss two problems with Simon's model. The first, which I will discuss in
Part H, is Simon's choice of "legal values" as the source of justice. Simon
presents two very different versions of how a lawyer might discern justice from
legal values. At times, a "legalistic" Simon suggests that lawyers discer justice
through the ordinary lawyer's means of legal analysis.22 This Simon suggests
that the lawyer should be controlled by the values actually found in the law. My
concern is that the law can be a poor source of values. At other times, a
"moralistic" Simon wants lawyers to ignore the ordinary means of discerning
law2u and to identify justice based on "legal ideals." But, of course, there are a
lot of "legal ideals." The "legal ideals" that a lawyer discerns are likely to look
a lot like the lawyer's ideals. This version of Simon's model would be likely to
cloak the lawyer's moral judgment in legal garb, giving it the authority of law.
I will argue that the "moralistic" version of Simon's model is likely to be
deceptive and to muddle moral issues. My suggestion is that in conversations
with clients, lawyers explicitly address moral issues as moral issues and that
lawyers and clients together seek to determine what would promote justice.
A second problem with either incarnation of Simon's model is that it will
exclude the client from participating in the resolution of many important issues
that arise in the law office. Simon's model, like that of Hoffnan and
Sharswood, is authoritarian. Whereas the "Dominant View" or client-centered
model of lawyering has no place for the values of the lawyer, Simon's model has
no place for the values of the client.24 In Part m, I will explore the authoritarian
and client-centered models of lawyering. I will also consider the possibility of
a collaborative model of lawyer-client relations, in which the client and lawyer
together wrestle with the demands of justice.
SIMON, supra note 5, at 126.
21. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 62-69; see infra text accompanying
notes 104-05. I also share Simon's view that a lawyer's judgment should be contextual.
See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707,
707-30 (1996).
22. "The range of sources and authorities and the modes of analysis and argument
that lawyers habitually employ in their everyday work are available and appropriate for
the central issues of legal ethics." SIMON, supra note 5, at 18.
23. Simon is critical of what he calls the positivist premise that "legal norms are
identified, procedurally, by their lineage to some organ of the state, and substantively,
by the fact that they are commands or prohibitions backed by sanctions." SIMON, supra
note 5, at 37.
24. In theory, if the morals to be applied by Simon's lawyer are coming from the
law, there is no place for the morals of the lawyer. Nevertheless, I suspect that the legal
ideals that Simon's lawyer discerns are likely to look very much like the lawyer's moral
ideals. Calling them "legal ideals" only cloaks them in mystery and removes them from
the ability of clients to evaluate them.
2000]
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]I. LAW AND MORALITY IN THE LAW OFFICE
A. The Legalistic Simon: Justice as Law
As noted previously, Simon at times argues that lawyers should discern
justice through the ordinary tools of legal analysis. He says, "The range of
sources and authorities and the modes of analysis and argument that lawyers
habitually employ in their everyday work are available and appropriate for the
central issues of legal ethics."25 My primary concern with Simon's justice-as-
law standard is that law can be dangerous. It can be used for evil as well as for
good. As Augustine noted long ago, governments can be little more than
criminal gangs.26 Countries, like gangs, may adopt laws that are not so good,
and the United States is not immune from this malady. During its history,
American law has at times supported slavery, sexism, segregation, exploitation
of immigrants, suppression of organized labor, paternalism, and imperialism.
Decisions during legal representation should not be based on such values or their
modem counterparts. A hundred years from now, some of our legal values
(individualism, harsh criminal punishment, nationalism, and materialism) may
seem as obviously wrong as our country's prior wrongs now appear to us. At
times we need prophetic insight. Law is unlikely to be a source of prophetic
insight. Law can be a source of injustice. Justice should be our source of law,
not law our source of justice.
The law of professional responsibility can be a source of injustice.
Consider the Leo Frank case, which Simon discusses. 27 In the early 1900s, Leo
Frank was convicted in Georgia of the murder of a young girl. Arthur Powell,
a Georgia lawyer, learned from a client that Leo Frank had been wrongfully
convicted. Powell, on the grounds of client confidentiality, did not reveal the
information to the authorities. A vigilante mob killed Frank while he was in
prison. According to the confidentiality rules of the legal profession, Powell
acted pioperly.28 The law governing lawyers led to the most unjust of results.
Simon seeks to rescue his justice-as-law theory by arguing that Powell
25. SIMON, supra note 5, at 18.
26. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 139 (Henry
Bettenson trans., 1972). Augustine noted:
[I]t was a witty and truthful rejoinder which was given by a captured pirate
to Alexander the Great. The king asked the fellow, 'What is your idea, in
infesting the sea?' And the pirate answered, with uninhibited insolence, 'The
same as yours, in infesting the earth! But because I do it with a tiny craft, I'm
called a pirate: because you have a mighty navy, you're called an emperor.'
Id.
27. SIMON, supra note 5, at 217 n.3 (discussing ARTHUR POWELL, I CAN GO HOME
AGAIN 287-92 (1943)). For Simon's discussion of the Frank case, see SIMON, supra note
5, at4, 163-64, 222 n.9.
28. SIMON, supra note 5, at 7.
[Vol. 65
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should have revealed the secret "as an act of principled commitment to legal
values more fundamental than those that support the rule." 9 Here, Simon speaks
in his moralistic voice, discussed in the following section, rather than his
legalistic voice. But if a lawyer takes seriously Simon's claim that legal values,
discerned by the "modes of analysis... that lawyers habitually employ in their
everyday work" are to control the lawyer's decisions, he or she is likely to keep
such information confidential. Georgia's duly constituted body, the state bar
association, with the approval of the state supreme court, had adopted a
confidentiality rule that precluded Powell from revealing his client's statements.
Legal precedent was strong. Every state had (and continues to have) a rule
protecting the confidentiality of this information. States have retained the broad
confidentiality rule, in spite of the example of the Frank case. Not only have
courts and bar associations adopted and retained a broad confidentiality rule, but
they also have frequently heaped high praise on it.30 I think that the moral
arguments for revealing Frank's innocence, the importance of human life, and
protecting the innocent, justify a lawyer revealing this information, but "legal
values" appear to be on the side of not revealing it.3
1
A second concern with Simon's justice-as-law standard is that law is often
indeterminate. 2 Simon's standard would not give clear guidance to lawyers in
many cases. The problem of indeterminacy is illustrated by the Frank case
discussed above. As I argued, Simon's legal ideals standard could easily lead
a lawyer to keep the information in the Frank case confidential, though Simon
concludes that the standard points in the opposite direction.
29. SIMoN, supra note 5, at 164.
30. See, e.g., A. v. B., 726 A.2d 924, 926 (N.J. 1999) (characterizing the
confidentiality rule as "crucial" to the attorney-client relationship, imposing a "sacred
trust" on the attorney); In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 322
(RI. 1993) (reflecting the Rules of Professional Conduct drafters' belief that the
confidentiality rule "is central to the attorney-client relationship"); Lawyer Disciplinary
Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 560 (W. Va. 1995) (noting that the confidentiality rule
"serves to vindicate the trust and reliance" on the part of clients that if not protected
"would undermine public confidence in the legal system").
31. Simon acknowledges that "most lay people would find [the problem] (correctly
in my [Simon's] view) a simple one with an obvious answer" whereas legal atterhpts to
identify an exception to the confidentiality rule have been "tortuous." SIMON, supra note
5, at 218 n.6 (citing Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals'
Ethical Dilemmas, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1543 (1996)). No doubt, the lay people would
address the problem as a moral issue.
32. That law is often indeterminate is one of the insights of the critical legal studies
movement ("CLS"), which Simon credits with influencing him. See SIMON, supra note
5, at 247. Worse, as those in the CLS movement have also noted, legal language
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B. The Moralistic Simon: Law as Morality
Whereas the legalistic Simon suggests that the lawyer should resolve issues
arising in the law office based on law discerned by the usual methods of legal
analysis, in other places a moralistic Simon scoffs at traditional legal
interpretation. Simon is critical of what he calls the "positivist premise" that
"legal norms are identified, procedurally, by their lineage to some organ of the
state, and substantively, by the fact that they are commands or prohibitions
backed by sanctions. 33 According to Simon, a positivist is one who "insist[s]
on some distinction between law and other types of norms."'34
In contrast, Simon (drawing from Ronald Dworkin's theory of judicial
decision making) defines law as morality. Simon prefers the substantivist to the
positivist view.
[The substantive conception of law] interprets specific legal
norms as expressions of more general principles that are
indissolubly legal and moral. It acknowledges the jurisdictional
rules that Positivism regards as preeminent, but it regards them
differently. First, it does not regard them as independent or
ultimate social facts, but as expressions of underlying values,
such as order, fairness, and democracy, and it insists on
33. SIMON, supra note 5, at 37.
34. SIMON, supra note 5, at 80. "So all Positivists will sometimes find themselves
in situations of tension between the norms they identify as legal and other norms."
SIMON, supra note 5, at 80-81. Simon accuses most of those with whom he
disagrees-both those who advocate that lawyers exercise moral (rather than legal)
judgment, see SIMON, supra note 5, at 15-18, and those who advocate the Dominant
View, see SIMON, supra note 5, at 27-of being positivists. Simon's definition of
positivism is far broader than most would accept. Under Simon's almost all
encompassing definition of "positivism," most natural law theorists-generally thought
to be the opposite of the positivists-would fall in the positivist camp. Under Simon's
defmition, even John Finnis would be a positivist. John Finnis is one of the most
prominent proponents of natural law theory. "No work has done more to revitalize the
natural law tradition in the English-speaking world than John Finnis's Natural Law and
Natural Rights (1980)." GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK K. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE:
TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 193 (1995). Finnis recognizes a
distinction between law and morals. For example, Finnis gives significant attention to
the question whether one has a moral obligation to obey "unjust laws" (a phrase which
for Simon would be an oxymoron). See JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 351-68 (1980). Finnis finds in a number of situations that there is not such an
obligation. Id. at 360-62. Indeed, Finnis is critical of those who refuse to use the term
"law" to refer to the rules of courts and legislatures. See infra note 50.
Ironically, there is a danger that Simon's deference to legal values will bring in the




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/8
THE RULE OF LA W(YERS)
interpreting the rules in light of these values. Second, it denies
that jurisdictional principles that prescribe the allocation of
authority for dispute resolution are more fundamental than
substantive principles that prescribe the just ordering of the social
world."
Simon identifies several substantivist theories: "[libertarianism,]
utilitarianism, wealth maximization, social rights theories such as that of John
Rawls, neo-Aristotelian theories of personal virtue, [and] coherence theories
such as that of Ronald Dworkin."'36 These theories, of course, are far from the
ordinary tools that lawyers use to discern the law. In this second expression of
Simon's model, "legal ideals"" override ordinary legal values. This moralistic
Simon would have lawyers determine the law based on the "substantive
principles that prescribe the just ordering of the social world,"38 rather than the
decisions of legislatures and judges. This Simon picks and chooses his sources
of law in a way that is far from usual in legal analysis. At times the legal support
for the positions that Simon suggests a lawyer should take is thin or nonexistent.
Consider a few examples.
As noted previously, despite the fact that there is a long history among
courts and bar associations of strong support for a broad confidentiality rule,
Simon argues that the lawyer who learns from a client that an innocent man has
been convicted should ignore the confidentiality rule and disclose the
exculpatory information.39 Simon insists that he is making a legal judgment,4"
but his analysis is long on moral judgment and short on legal support. His
language is the language of morality. According to Simon, application of the
confidentiality rule in the innocent convict case would be "absurd[]."'W Failure
to disclose exculpatory facts "would be grotesque. '42  A "rule forbidding
35. SIMON, supra note 5, at 82.
36. SIMON, supra note 5, at 82.
37. In looking to "legal ideals," Simon follows Dworkin's theory of judicial
decision making. Dworkin suggests that decisions must be based on the "moral
principles that underlie the community's institutions." RONALD DwoRKiN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 160 (1979). Dworkin acknowledges that this search "must carry the
lawyer very deep into political and moral theory." Id. at 66-67.
38. SIMON, supra note'5, at 82; supra text accompanying note 35.
39. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 164. I agree with Simon that the lawyer should
reveal the information, but as a matter of moral judgment, rather than legal judgment.
40. "[T]he lawyer should defy. the rule, not as an act of lawlessness, but as an act
of principled commitment to legal values more fundamental than those that support the
rule." SIMON, supra note 5, at 164.
41. SIMON, supra note 5, at 164.
42. SIMON, supra note 5, at 164.
2000]
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disclosure would be degrading.... " Simon cites no legal sources that justify
revealing the confidential information.
A second example of Simon appearing to follow morals rather than the law
is his differing treatment of one client's tax avoidance problem and another
client's welfare benefits problem. In both cases, obtaining the benefit for the
client would be contrary to the intent of the statute." In the tax case, Simon
argues that the lawyer "should not proceed with a plan that would frustrate [the
purpose of the tax law]."45 In the welfare case, Simon argues that the lawyer
might be justified in disregarding [the purpose of the statute] if
she thought it problematic. A purpose is problematic if it
endangers fundamental values. The lawyer might decide that the
claimant's interest in a minimally adequate income is a value of
exceptional legal importance, that the AFDC grant levels provide
considerably less than a minimally adequate income, and the plan
in question might move her closer to one.
46
In the welfare case, Simon strains to find support for the conclusion that the right
to adequate income is a fundamental legal value. Citing two 1970 decisions,
Simon argues, "Although the Supreme Court has denied that rights to minimal
subsistence are 'fundamental' in some contexts, it has recognized them as
exceptionally important.4 7 In addition, he argues that if the state benefits are
below the federal poverty standard, the federal poverty standard might serve as
legal support for seeking the benefit.48 Given such weak legal support, it is
apparent that Simon's conclusion is based more on moral values than legal
values. The fact that he can find some legal support does not mean that his
decision is based on legal values. It is one thing to argue that lawyers should
point to legal values to justify what they do. It is quite another to argue, as
Simon does, that lawyers should be controlled by legal values.
Simon argues that to discern what is moral is to discern the law. On this
basis, he is able to argue that a lawyer always has a duty to obey "the law."
The duty to obey follows more or less straightforwardly from the
definition [of the law]. Any argument for disobedience against a
43. SIMON, supra note 5, at 164.
44. Simon initially assumes that the purpose of the welfare statute is unclear. In
such circumstances, he finds it appropriate for the lawyek to pursue the benefit for the
client. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 148. I address his last variation on the welfare
problem. In it, "the lawyer found stronger indication of a purpose to preclude" the client
from getting the benefit. SIMON, supra note 5, at 148-49.
45. SIMON, supra note 5, at 147.
46. SIMON, supra note 5, at 148-49.
47. SIMON, supra note 5, at 149.
48. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 149.
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particular command would also be an argument that the command was
an incorrect interpretation of the law.4 9
Simon conflates legal judgment and moral judgment. If the command of a state
is immoral, it is not law; and as a matter of law, the lawyer should not obey it.
Others recognize that the term "law" can be used in this ideal sense, but also
acknowledge that it can be used (and generally is used) to refer to rules adopted
by legal bodies (irrespective of the morality of those rules).50 Of course,
definitions have consequences, and a lawyer's definition of law will have
consequences in the law office. It appears that Simon views (and would present
to clients) moral advice as legal advice. He is critical of those of us"' who argue
that moral judgment is separate from legal judgment and that the lawyer should
address many issues of legal ethics as moral (rather than legal) issues. I will
49. SIMON, supra note 5, at 85.
50. John Finnis, one of today's strongest advocates that law should embody moral
content, says, "It is not conducive to clear thought, or to any good practical purpose, to
smudge the positivity of the law by denying the legal obligatoriness in the legal or intra-
systemic sense of a rule recently affirmed as legally valid and obligatory by the highest
institution of the 'legal system."' FINNIS, supra note 34, at 357.
In Simon's suggestion that the test for legal validity is moral validity, he appears
to embody the caricature of natural law that so many (true) positivists (John Austin,
Joseph Raz, H.L.A. Hart, and Hans Kelson) have attacked. See FINNIs, supra note 34,
at 26. For example, John Austin argues:
[I]f I object to [the imposition of a death sentence for "an act innocuous, or
positively beneficial"], that it is contrary to the law of God ... the Court of
Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me
up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity.
FINNIs, supra note 34, at 355 (quoting Austin).
Simon's proposal that lawyers while advising clients ignore the common perception
of law is particularly troubling. It would be one thing for Simon to submit to the
punishment of the state, taking comfort in the belief that he had violated no "law."
However, Simon's lawyer should be careful about failing to advise a client of a state's
(immoral) command on the basis that it is no "law."
I refer to the law-as-morality position as a caricature of natural law, because, as
John Finnis has noted, the critics of natural law do not cite any natural lawyers who fit
such a description, nor does Finnis know of any. See FIN S, supra note 34, at 26. As
Finnis notes, natural law advocates have differentiated between the "focal meaning" or
"ideal type" of a concept and its "undeveloped, primitive, corrupt, deviant" uses. The
term "law" can be used of the ideal, but it can also be used of mere commands. FINNIS,
supra note 34, at 9-11. The phrase "an unjust law is no law," which is at times attributed
to natural lawyers, uses the term "law" in both senses. An "unjust law" is a law in a
sense, but it is "no law" in the ideal sense. FINNIS, supra note 34, at 363-65 (discussing
Aquinas's use of various senses of the term "law").
51. Simon puts David Luban, Thomas Shaffer, and me in this camp. See SIMON,
supra note 5, at 16-17.
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consider Simon's criticisms of this position in the following section. 2 But first
I consider Simon's morality-as-law proposal. I see several problems with it.
First, there is a danger that clients will misunderstand what they are getting
from Simon's lawyer. Simon's definition of law-as-morality is different from
the common understanding. The client is likely to understand "the law" to be
what those legal bodies that have jurisdiction over him require him to do.
Suggesting that, as a matter of a client's legal responsibility, the client must
respect the interests of a third party or the public when the state does not require
such protection, is likely to mislead clients.
Most people believe that when they hire a lawyer, the lawyer will tell them
what the state requires them to do. It appears that Simon's lawyer would tell
them what "[the] substantive principles that prescribe the just ordering of the
social world"53 require them to do. Simon wants his lawyer's moral judgment
to have the authority of the law. I will argue in the following section that the
lawyer should discuss such issues with clients as matters of moral
responsibility,54 but if the state does not require a client to do "X," the lawyer
should not lead the client to believe that it does. If a lawyer follows Simon's
model of lawyering, she should explain to clients the difference that is likely to
exist between the lawyer's and the client's understandings of the word "law."
A second concern is that Simon's lawyer is likely to be authoritarian.
Simon's criteria-whether "law," "legal values," or "legal ideals"-for
determining the lawyer's actions are beyond the understanding of the ordinary
client. Under Simon's model, decision making in the law office becomes the
province of the legal expert. Simon's lawyer is likely to control the client in
areas where I believe the client should maintain control-areas where organs of
the state have not chosen to exercise control. One of the things that lawyers do
is empower people. They enable clients to know what the legislature and the
courts require of them. Generally, lawyers should expand, not limit, the client's
power. Simon argues that lawyers should have this opportunity to exercise
moral agency,55 but Simon's system would rob clients of the opportunity to
exercise moral agency. As between the lawyer and the client, the client
generally should control decisions made in the law office. Part III of this essay
provides further discussion of authoritarian lawyering.56
A third and related concern is that Simon's system is likely to stifle moral
discourse. It would give lawyers responsibility for decisions that clients
currently make in consultation with their lawyers." We can only grow (as
52. See infra text accompanying notes 67-83.
53. SIMON, supra note 5, at 82.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 67-83.
55. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 114.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 85-101.
57. Under the professional rules that are currently in effect in most jurisdictions,
the client controls the ends of the representation, and the lawyer, in consultation with the
client, controls the means. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a)
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individuals and as a society) in our ability to exercise moral deliberation as we
exercise our moral muscles. Lawyers should not remove the responsibility for
that exercise from clients. Lawyers and clients are more likely to thoughtfully
engage in moral discussion if they acknowledge that they face moral issues,
rather than muddying the waters by describing them as "legal" issues. We need
to rediscover the ability to talk about moral values, not substitute legal values for
them."8
Finally, "the substantive principles that prescribe the just ordering of the
social world" on which Simon's moralist lawyer relies to resolve issues in the
law office are likely to be even less determinate than the "legal values" on which
Simon's legalist lawyer relies. As noted previously, Simon identifies several
substantivist theories of law: libertarianism, utilitarianism, wealth maximization,
liberalism, and virtue ethics.59 Each of these schools of philosophy has different
understandings of "the substantive principles that prescribe the just ordering of
the social world." Each has a different perception of justice. We are back to
Alasdair MacIntyre's question: "Whose Justice?" Ronald Dworkin, on whom
Simon relies for his law-as-morality theory,"0 argues that judges should look to
a society's shared moral principles first in determining the law. But, as




Given the broad range of sources that Simon cites as potential sources of
substantive doctrine, it is likely that different lawyers will identify very different
"legal ideals." How will a lawyer who finds the law in the "substantive
principles that prescribe the just ordering of the social world" advise clients?
Will a pro-life lawyer tell a client that the law precludes her from having an
(1999).
58. As noted previously, Simon bases his law-as-morality definition on Ronald
Dworkin's theory of judicial decision making. There is an analogy between the
responsibility that Dworkin gives to judges and the responsibility that Simon gives to
lawyers. In Dworkin's judicial model, judges make decisions based on the "principles"
underlying legislation, rather than the language or intent of the legislature. See FINNIS,
supra note 34, at 356 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 37, chs. 2-4). Dworkin gives judges
power to determine law and to ignore legislatures. Simon gives lawyers power to
determine law and to ignore both legislatures and judges. The danger is that Simon and
Dworkin undercut the important role that persuasion should play both in democracies and
in relationships.
59. See SiMON, supra note 5, at 82.
60. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 39, 82, 247.
61. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 236 (1981). Maclntyre cites Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding by a 5-4 vote that
state educational institutions could take race into consideration in admissions, but by a
different 5-4 majority held that they could not set aside specific places for minority
applicants) to illustrate that the United States Supreme Court is more likely to serve as
a "peacekeeping or truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of
conflict not by invoking our shared moral first principles." MACINTYRE, supra, at 236.
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abortion, when the Supreme Court gives her that right? Will an environmentalist
lawyer tell a client that the law precludes him from polluting, when the
legislature has created an exemption for the client's pollution? The
indeterminate nature of legal ideals compounds my earlier concern with the
authoritarian nature of Simon's lawyer. The lawyer is likely to choose legal
ideals based on her moral values. It will not necessarily be legal ideals that
control the client; it is likely to be the lawyer's ideals.
The indeterminate nature of a legal ideals standard is illustrated by the
differing answers that such a standard would give to the central issue of Simon's
book: What should be the role of lawyers? As Simon acknowledges, if we look
to the law of lawyering, we find little support for Simon's view. The law of
lawyering tends to support the Dominant View.62 Simon spends much of his
book challenging this aspect of the law of lawyering. Simon argues that we
should look to legal ideals to control the lawyer's actions, but even if we look
beneath the rules, to the "legal ideals" of the law of lawyering, we find a wide
variety of views. Simon argues eloquently that lawyers should pursue the legal
ideal of justice, but no more eloquently than others argue that lawyers should
pursue the legal ideal of client autonomy. Monroe Freedman, Simon's primary
example of the "Dominant View" of lawyering, 63 says:
One of the essential values of a just society is respect for the
dignity of each member of that society. Essential to each individual's
dignity is the free exercise of his autonomy. Toward that end, each
person is entitled to know his rights with respect to society and other
individuals, and to decide whether to seek fulfillment of those rights
through the due processes of law....
[T]he attorney acts both professionally and morally in assisting
clients to maximize their autonomy. . . . [T]he attorney acts
unprofessionally and immorally by depriving clients of their
autonomy, that is, by denying them information regarding their legal
rights, by otherwise preempting their moral decisions, or by depriving
them of the ability to carry out their lawful decisions.'
Both Freedman and Simon ground their systems in legal ideals. Freedman
grounds his views in the Constitution, and contrasts his views (as Simon
contrasts Simon's views6 ) with those who find the basis for lawyering in moral
62. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 7-8.
63. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 243 (citing MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LEGAL ETHICS (1990)).
64. FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 57; see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073
(1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
65. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 17.
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philosophy. 66 Obviously, Freedman's legal ideals differ from those of Simon.
It does not appear that legal ideals give a clear answer, even to the issue of what
model of lawyering the lawyer should adopt.
C. The Alternative: Explicit Moral Judgment
The alternative to Simon's lawyer's "legal judgment" is the explicit exercise
of moral judgment. Simon conflates legality and morality, but the general
understanding is that there is a difference between the two. The law requires
some things of people, but leaves much to the client's and the lawyer's
discretion.67 This area of discretion should be a place for the exercise of explicit
moral judgment in the law office. In Stephen Pepper's words, the place for
lawyers' ethics is, "in the gap between law and justice."6 The lawyer should
explain to a client the requirements of legislatures, administrative agencies, and
courts and discuss with the client what the client should do in the area in which
the law grants discretion.
69
Simon makes several criticisms of those of us who have advocated that
issues in the law office be resolved based on moral judgment."0 His first
criticism is that such morality is "personal"; 71 it is based merely on the "personal
66. "Professor Shaffer thinks of lawyer's ethics as being rooted in moral
philosophy, while I think of lawyers' ethics as being rooted in the Bill of Rights as
expressed in the American adversary system." FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 7. Simon
also argues that his views of legal ethics are grounded in law in contrast to the views of
Shaffer, David Luban, and me, which Simon argues are grounded in a "role moral"
argument. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 15-17.
67. This is not to suggest that law is separate from morality in the sense that the
positivists argue. Most law is based on a moral understanding and imposes some sort of
moral judgment. In order to discern what the law is, the lawyer must understand the
morality underlying the law. Legislatures and courts use terms and concepts that cannot
be understood except in light of their moral foundation. Nevertheless, legislatures and
courts do not seek to control every, or even most, moral issues. They leave a significant
area for the exercise of discretion.
68. Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers'Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40
S. TEx. L. REv. 181 (1999).
69. I do not mean to suggest that this area of discretion is the only area for lawyer-
client moral discourse. In the case of a law of questionable morality, the lawyer and
client may have a moral responsibility to determine whether civil disobedience is
justified.
70. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 16 & 218 n.16.
71. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 15-18. This is a substantial change from Simon's
earlier position. In a 1978 law review article, Simon encouraged lawyers to act based on
their personal ethics. He argued for what he called "non-professional advocacy." Simon
stated: "The foundation principle of non-professional advocacy is that the problems of
advocacy be treated as a matter of personal ethics .... [P]ersonal ethics require that
individuals take responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. They cannot defer
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predispositions of various individuals." Simon argues that decisions in the law
office should be based on legal values, "values solidly grounded in the public
culture of the society and the legal system."73
In his characterization of moral judgment as either "personal" or "public,"
Simon reflects modernism's notion of morals. Simon's world has two forms of
morality: the "personal predispositions of various individuals" and "values
solidly grounded in the public culture of the society and the legal system."74
However, as Alasdair Macntyre has shown, moral insight is likely to be the
product, not of the individual or of the mega-community, but of intermediate
communities and their traditions of moral analysis.75 For example, Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s civil rights movement was not primarily the product of
"individual preferences" or of the public culture, but of a prophetic religious
community's long history of moral discourse.76 It may be that a lawyer who
exercises moral judgment will merely draw on her personal views, but I hope
that she will draw from richer traditions of moral analysis.
Simon argues that the judgments of lawyers on moral issues can often be
characterized as either moral or legal judgments, and he argues, on what appear
to be pragmatic grounds, that it is best to characterize them as legal judgments.'
Simon suggests that those of us who argue for explicit moral judgment weaken
the impact of our moral judgment by not labeling it "legal judgment. ' 78
According to Simon, characterizing a decision as a legal judgment "suggests that
the matter is susceptible to resolution in terms of the analytical methods and
sources of legal argument. While these methods and sources are loose, they are
typically thought to be more structured and grounded than popular moral
discourse." '79 Simon's implicit criticism of moral judgment is that it is typically
thought to be loose, unstructured, and ungrounded. (Note that Simon does not
here say that legal judgments are structured and grounded; only that they are
"thought to be" so.)80 Simon goes on to say that the characterization of moral
to institutions with autonomous ethical momentum." William H. Simon, The Ideology
ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 13 1.
72. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 17. At times, he seems to withdraw his criticism.
"[Those who argue that the lawyer should exercise moral judgment] recognize that the
values competing with client interests in the core instances of legal ethics are not just
subjective predispositions." SIMON, supra note 5, at 17.
73. SIMON, supra note 5, at 17.
74. SIMON, supra note 5, at 17.
75. See MACINTYRE, supra note 61, at 221.
76. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham City Jail, in THE
RHETORIC OF THE CIVIL-RIGHTS MOVEMENT 37 (Haig A. Bosmajian & Hamida
Bosmajian eds., 1969).
77. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 102.
78. SIMON, supra note 5, at 102.
79. SIMON, supra note 5, at 102.
80. SIMON, supra note 5, at 102 (emphasis added).
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judgment in the law office as moral judgment has led to the perception of it as
"subjective and peripheral" to the lawyer's business.8 1 "The tools offered in
popular culture for considering moral problems seem too formless and
subjective; those offered by academic philosophy seem too abstract and
multifarious. 82 If Simon is right, neither our popular culture nor our teachers
of moral philosophy have served us well.
The thing that is most troubling about Simon's book is his suggestion that
respect for moral judgment has sunk so low that we must label it "legal
judgment" before people will give it weight. As Martin Luther King, Jr. taught
us, moral values are more important than legal values. In his "Letter from
Birmingham City Jail," King declared that a "just law is a man-made code that
squares with the moral law or the law of God.8 3 For King, moral values stood
injudgment of legal values. King and his lawyers used the law, but there was
never much doubt that their moral direction came from elsewhere. If the
reputation of moral analysis has sunk as low as Simon suggests, we should work
to renew our tools of moral analysis, not retreat to the legal barricades.
My view is that moral analysis has greater respect among the public than
Simon suggests. In spite of the influences of the relativists of popular culture
and academic moral philosophy, when you ask people, "What would be fair?,"
most are likely to have a thoughtful answer. The values that they have learned
from their homes, churches, and synagogues and the empathy that they feel
when they consider other people are more likely than Simon suggests to lead
them to justice. Lawyers should identify moral issues as moral issues and
encourage clients to make decisions based on their deepest moral values. I will
discuss the means by which lawyers might raise and discuss such issues with
clients through a collaborative model of client counseling in Part mII of this
essay. 4
III. DECISION MAKING IN THE LAW OFFICE
Simon at times heralds a legalistic lawyer whose choices are controlled by
"legal judgments grounded in methods and sources of authority of the
professional culture" 5 and at other times heralds a moralistic lawyer whose
choices are controlled by "the substantive principles that prescribe the just
ordering of the social world. ' 6 One problem with both of Simon's lawyers is
81. SIMON, supra note 5, at 102.
82. SIMON, supra note 5, at 18.
83. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 293 (James M.
Washington ed. 1986), quoted in STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 38
(1993).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 112-19.
85. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 138.
86. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 82.
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that they appear to have no place for the client's values. Under Simon's models,
issues in the law office are issues for legal specialists. Anthony Kronman's
recent book on the loss of meaning in law practice is entitled The Lost Lawyer;
87
Simon's book might have been entitled The Lost Client.
In giving the responsibility for resolving moral issues in representation to
the lawyer, Simon's models run counter to the client-centered model of
counseling that has dominated legal education for the last twenty years, and
returns to the authoritarian model of an earlier era. In this Part, I will identify
Simon's place among these lawyer/client models. Finally, I will suggest a
collaborative model of legal counseling that draws on the resources of both
lawyer and client.
A. The Authoritarian Tradition
As noted in Part I, in some respects Simon patterns his model of lawyering
on that of the early gentleman-lawyers, David Hoffnan and George
Sharswood."8 Like Simon, they considered the lawyer to be responsible for
justice. David Hoffman said that a lawyer should not advocate a legal position
unless he believes that the position is good for the country. "[S]hould the
principle... be wholly at variance with sound law," he said, "it would be
dishonorable folly in me to endeavor to incorporate it into the jurisprudence of
the country.1
8 9
Hoffman and Sharswood trusted lawyers, but they did not trust clients.
Sharswood said, "It is in some measure the duty of counsel to be the keeper of
the conscience of the client; not to suffer him, through the influence of his
feelings or interest, to do or saying anything wrong in itself, and of which he
would himself afterwards repent."90 Hoffman disapproved of lawyers who
87. KRONMAN, supra note 1. Kronman mourns the fact that lawyers no longer
seem to be involved in meaningful decision making in the law office. Clients (and
partners) increasingly give lawyers narrower and narrower assignments, making it
difficult for lawyers to exercise and develop the practical wisdom that is the most
meaningful aspect of law practice. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 283-91, 299-307.
Simon complains that Kronman's book has almost no examples of lawyers in
ordinary practice. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 23-25. Simon's book shares a similar
shortcoming. His book has no examples of client/lawyer interactions, and he does not
discuss how his project might affect clients.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15; see also William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1134-35 (1988). For commentary on
Hoffman and Sharswood and substantial excerpts from their writings on lawyers, see
SHAFFER, supra note 11, at 59-164, 169-70, 177-80, 197-206, 220-31, 337-39, 354-59.
89. DAVID HOFFMAN, Resolutions on Professional Deportment, No. MIV, in II A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752, 755 (2d ed. 1836), quoted in Shaffer, supra note 11, at
64.
90. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1854), quoted in
SHAFFER, supra note 11, at 225.
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invoke statutes of limitation 6r the law of infancy to defeat otherwise valid
contract claims. Of the client w.ho wants to raise such a defense, Hoffinan said,
"He shall never make me a partner in his knavery.',
91
Judge Clement Haynsworth, a modem gentleman-lawyer, reflected similar
sentiments to a law school graduating class:
[The lawyer] serves his clients without being their servant. He serves
to further the lawful and proper objective of the client, but the lawyer
must never forget that he is the master. He is not there to do the
client's bidding. It is for the lawyer to decide what is morally and
legally right, and, as a professional, he cannot give in to a client's
attempt to persuade him to take some other stand.... During my
years of practice, . . . I told [my clients] what would be done and
firly rejected suggestions that I do something else which I felt
improper .... 92
In his 1974 study, Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge?,93 Douglas
Rosenthal found that lawyers were in charge.94 He found that the lawyer
"exercise[d] predominant control over and responsibility for the problem-solving
delegated to him rather passively by the client."9' Lawyers assumed that the
solutions to legal problems were primarily technical and that they were the
experts in the technical skills needed to rqach the correct conclusion.96
But there was a big difference between the authoritarian lawyers of
Hoffinan and Sharswood and the authoritarian lawyers that Rosenthal
discovered. Hoffman's and Sharswood's lawyers were controlled by moral
considerations; Rosenthal found that the modem authoritarian lawyers ignored
moral considerations. As one client said of his lawyer after the lawyer advised
him to seek substantial damages for a modest injury:
[T]he lawyer is a reassuring presence who takes away your guilt
feelings. He says, "Hey, this is the way the game is played; you take
as much as you can get; it's what they expect; it's the way it's done."
He takes upon his own shoulders the burden of your guilt-he's the
professional.97
91. HOFFMAN, supra note 89, at 754.
92. Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. REV.
627, 628 (1976).
93. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
94. Rosenthal referred to this as the traditional model.
95. ROSENTHAL, supra note 93, at 2.
96. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 93, at 169.
97. ROSENTHAL, supra note 93, at 171.
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If the traditional authoritarian lawyer was a guru, ensuring that clients acted
morally, the modem authoritarian lawyer is a godfather, protecting client
interests at the expense of others.98
In some respects, Simon wants to return to the traditional lawyer, the lawyer
who ensures that clients pursue justice. But Simon adds a new twist. The
traditional lawyer was confident that he knew what justice was; Simon's lawyer
is not so confident. Simon's lawyer determines justice based on legal values.
As with Rosenthal's lawyers,99 legal problems become primarily technical
problems for the lawyer, for in Simon's formulation, "justice" is a highly
technical legal issue for experts."° Simon's models place moral judgment on the
lawyer's turf.
As I suggested in a previous section, authoritarian models of lawyering are
inconsistent with client dignity.'" The authoritarian lawyer interferes with the
client's control of his life. Legal representation should increase that control, not
limit it. Humility is justified when approaching the moral issues that arise in the
law office. None of us has perfect ability to discern the good. There is a danger
that lawyers will be confident of their moral judgment (or in Simon's case, of the
law's moral judgment) when confidence is not justified.
B. The Client-Centered Counselor
For the past twenty years, the primary alternative to the authoritarian lawyer
has been the client-centered legal counselor. 2 According to the leading client-
centered counseling text, client-centered counseling
involves having clients actively participate in identifying their
problems, formulating potential solutions and making decisions. Thus,
98. The reference is to the godfather of the Mario Puzo novel and the Francis Ford
Coppola films. For a discussion of guru and godfather lawyers, see SHAFFER &
COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 30-39, 5-14.
99. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 93, at 169.
100. When we look at some of the standards that Simon wishes lawyers to employ
in addressing these problems, the technical, legal nature of his project is apparent. He
analyzes the ethical issues that lawyers face in terms of three tensions: substance versus
procedure, purpose versus form, and broad versus narrow framing. See SIMON, supra
note 5, at 139-56. For a discussion of the highly technical nature of the determination
that Simon envisions, see David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN.
L. REv. 873, 893-95 (1999). Luban suggests that the analysis is so technical
("exceedingly professorial") that lawyers are unlikely to engage in it. Id. at 894.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
102. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17; DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977);
BINDER ET AL., supra note 18.
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client-centered lawyering emanates from a belief in the autonomy,
intelligence, dignity, and basic morality of the individual client.' °3
Client-centered counseling focuses on the desires of the client. "Because client
autonomy is of paramount importance, decisions should be made on the basis of
what choice is most likely to provide a client with maximum satisfaction.1 °"4 In
this respect, the client-centered model incorporates the Dominant View of law
practice of which Simon is so critical.0 5 In the client-centered view, the lawyer
should not act in ways that would influence the client's choice. The lawyer
should be "neutral ' ' 06 and "nonjudgmental."'' 7 Whereas the client has a very
limited role in the authoritarian model, the lawyer has a very limited role in the
client-centered model.
When a decision is to be made during the representation, the client-centered
lawyer and client list on a sheet of paper all of the alternative courses of action
and the "consequences to the client" of each.' The lawyer identifies each
potential consequence as either an advantage or a disadvantage to the client,"0 9
and the client chooses from the options.
The biggest problem with the client-centered model is that clients consider
only consequences to the client. This ignores the importance of other people.
Justice is not a concern of the lawyer or the client. In the illustration that one
client-centered book gives of the client-centered counseling method, a client is
considering suing his neighbor for a zoning violation. The authors suggest that
the lawyer ask, "How important to the client is his friendship with [the
neighbor]?"" 0 Under this model, the client considers the consequences to the
neighbor solely in light of the effect that they will have on the client; it gives the
neighbor no independent moral significance. The counseling plan suggests that
if the neighbor is not a friend or if the client's friendship with the neighbor is not
important, the neighbor is not worthy of consideration."'
103. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 18 (footnote omitted).
104. BINDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 261; see also BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra
note 17, at 256.
105. It is not clear that the lawyers who hold what Simon describes as the
Dominant View would necessarily allow clients to control decisions in the law office.
They might play the godfather, controlling decisions for the client and ignoring the
interests of others.
106. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 102, at 166; BINDER ET AL., supra note 18, at
288-89.
107. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 57.
108. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 246-48; BINDER & PRICE, supra
note 102, at 184-85; BINDERETAL., supra note 18, at 307.
109. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 102, at 168.
110. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 246.
111. The client-centered counselors suggest that the lawyer might legitimately raise
moral concerns when the client makes a decision that the lawyer believes is "morally
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The client-centered counselors argue that their methods are neutral, but their
methods are likely to influence clients to make self-serving choices. Client-
centered lawyers lead clients to focus on their own interests, rather than the
interests of others. They impose a framework of client selfishness. Client-
centered lawyers are likely to produce self-centered clients.
In some situations, it may be that the client-centered model's focus on client
empowerment is justified. Generally, poor people need empowerment. Poor
clients tend to defer to lawyers, and their lawyers may be tempted to tell clients
what to do. Lawyers for poor people may need the client-centered model's focus
on client autonomy. In those cases in which the lawyer represents a poor client
against a rich opponent, there is probably little need for the poor client to worry
about the interests of the rich opponent-the rich opponent likely will have
plenty of lawyers to look out for his interests. But when a lawyer represents the
wealthy client against the (often unrepresented) poor party, the lawyer's
exclusive focus on client autonomy is likely to result in injustice. If clients with
great power (those who produce dangerous products, have many employees, or
have a great impact on the environment) make decisions based solely on
"consequences to the client," they (and their lawyers) can cause great harm.
C. A Collaborative Model
Whereas the authoritarian models provide too small a role for clients, the
client-centered approach provides too small a role for lawyers. An alternative
to the authoritarian and client-centered models is a collaborative decision-
making model, in which lawyer and client together address and resolve issues
wrong." The lawyer might try and persuade the client to change his mind. See BASTRESS
& HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 334-35; see also BINDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 282-
84. However, there are likely to be problems with attempting to engage in moral
discourse at this stage. Shaffer and Cochran state:
First, client-centered counselors' moral discourse comes into play only when
the lawyer feels that the client wants to do something that is "morally wrong."
Morality (in and out of the law office) is not generally a matter of choosing
whether to do something that is "morally wrong"; more often it is a choice
between something that is better and something that is worse. It may not be
often that the client will make a choice that the lawyer feels is "morally
wrong," but clients constantly are faced with issues that have moral
implications. We feel that those moral implications should be considered
during the decision-making process.
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 23-24 (footnote omitted).
Second, the method of moral discourse suggested by the client-centered counselors
is likely to be ineffective. After lawyers encourage the client to see things solely from
the client's perspective and the client makes a decision, it will be difficult for lawyers to
shift gears and reverse the direction of the counseling. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra
note 1, at 24.
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that arise in the representation. 2 A collaborative model of lawyering is
emerging from several sources.
Douglas Rosenthal not only exposed the authoritarian nature of many
lawyers, but he also suggested the outlines of a collaborative model of
lawyer/client relations. He called for lawyers and clients to engage in "mutual
participation in a cooperative relationship in which the cooperating parties have
relatively equal status, are equally dependent, and are engaged in activity that
will be in some ways satisfying to both [parties]."' 3 A collaborative model
would seek to draw on the strengths of both lawyer and client.
Thomas Shaffer and others have used the friendship analogy to illustrate
how a lawyer might raise and discuss issues with a client."' Anthony Kronman
explains how the sympathy and detachment that a friend (or a lawyer) brings to
a relationship can help someone make a wise decision:
Friends take each other's interests seriously and wish to see them
advanced; it is part of the meaning of friendship that they do. It does
not follow, however, that friends always accept uncritically each
other's accounts of their own needs. Indeed, friends often exercise a
large degree of independent judgment in assessing each other's
interests, and the feeling that one sometimes has an obligation to do so
is also an important part of what the relation of friendship means.
What makes such independence possible is the ability of friends to
exercise greater detachment when reflecting on each other's needs
than they are often able to achieve when reflecting on their own. A
112. For a more comprehensive development of a collaborative decision-making
model, see ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH To LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1999). James
Moliterno and John Levy describe the collaborative model as follows:
The lawyer and client say, "Let's work together to reach the objective." They
share responsibility for diagnosis, action and implementation. They divide
responsibility along sensible lines accounting for the lawyer's training and
experience and the client's concern about the representation matter.
JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK 86 (1993).
113. ROSENTHAL, supra note 93, at 10.
114. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 40-54; Thomas L. Shaffer, A
Lesson From Trollope for Counselors at Law, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 727, 733-35
(1978); see also Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA.
L. REv. 439, 455-59 (1990). In an earlier incarnation of his views of lawyer/client
relationships, Simon called on lawyers and clients to act as partners, assuming mutual
responsibility for the resolution of moral issues in the relationship. See William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 29, 131-33.
Charles Fried uses the friendship analogy for a very different purpose, suggesting
that just as friends prefer friends to other people, lawyers should prefer clients to other
people. See Fried, supra note 64, 1071-75.
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friend's independence can be of immense value, and is frequently the
reason why one friend turns to another for advice. Friends of course
expect sympathy from each other: it is the expectation of sympathy
that distinguishes a friend from a stranger. But they also want
detachment, and those who lack either quality are likely to be poor
friends."1
5
The friendship analogy is especially helpful in illustrating how a lawyer and
client might address moral issues under a collaborative model. Whereas Simon
suggests that lawyers should unilaterally seek the justice that they find in legal
values, under a collaborative model the lawyer would raise and discuss such
issues with a client in the manner that friends raise and discuss such issues,
neither ignoring such matters nor imposing her views on the client. Unlike
Simon's lawyer, who looks to "legal values" for justice, the collaborative lawyer
and client would seek to resolve issues based on the client's moral values.
Justice would be a subject of lawyer/client discourse. Even though it would be
the client who ultimately makes the decisions in the relationship, the lawyer as
friend and counselor may have a substantial impact on those decisions.
In the law office, justice is generally a matter of(1) considering the interests
of other people, and (2) treating those people fairly. The lawyer can suggest
both of these factors as part of the decision making process. One of the stages
of decision making in the law office is considering the likely consequences of
alternate courses of action. As noted previously, the client-centered counselors
suggest that the lawyer and client consider only "consequences to the client."
But the lawyer and client should consider the consequences to other people as
well. The lawyer and client should consider all of the consequences that might
arise from various alternatives. As a part of the decision making process, the
lawyer can easily ask the client to help identify the consequences to other people
of the alternatives.
A second place at which the lawyer and client might consider the interests
of other people is the final point of decision making. The focus of discussion
should be on how the client's ethics address the questions that they confront. A
lawyer can raise this by merely asking a client what would be fair. 16 Like
Simon's model, collaborative decision making would be contextual. The client
and lawyer would resolve issues in the way that seems fair in light of all of the
facts and circumstances.
There is, of course, the danger that either the lawyer or client will dominate
the other, that the relationship will not be one of mutuality. With many clients,
the lawyer is in the dominant position. The lawyer has the knowledge of the law
and the trappings of power. She has the secretaries and the certificates and sits
115. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 131-32.
116. For a more fully developed discussion of how the lawyer/client conversation
might be structured, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, 94-134.
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behind the big desk in the elevated chair. Unsophisticated clients may want the
lawyer to control the action. But in another world of lawyering, the client is
likely to be in the position of power. The lawyer may be little more than an
employee of the corporate client. If the lawyer is in-house counsel she will be
an employee of the corporate client. The CEO is likely to sit behind the bigger
desk, in the more elevated chair. In both of these settings, the lawyer will have
to work to attain any level of equality with the client. The lawyer may need to
empower the weak client and assert herself with the strong client.
There are several things that a lawyer can do to move toward equality with
the client. For example, the lawyer can see that the names by which she and the
client refer to one another convey equality. If the powerless client calls the
lawyer by a formal name ("Ms. Jones"), the lawyer can refer to the client by a
formal name ("Mr. Smith"). If the powerful client calls the lawyer by her first
name ("Lisa"), the lawyer can refer to the client by his first name ("Ed").
At many points in conversations with clients, the lawyer has an opportunity
to either empower the client or to assert power over the client. In my view, the
role of the lawyer should vary, depending on the client and the circumstances.'
At one end of the spectrum, a lawyer representing a poor, unsophisticated client
should generally engage in little or no persuasion. She might ask questions in
a nondirective manner: "Would anyone else be affected if you chose this
option?" and "What do you think would be fair?" With this client, the lawyer
should be much like the client-centered lawyer; her primary concern should
generally be empowering the client.
At the other end of the spectrum, a lawyer who learns that a corporate
executive approved the sale of defective kidney dialysis machines... should be
quite directive, using methods that border on those of an authoritarian lawyer:
emotionally raising the interests of others ("Think what you might do to these
patients!"), making moral judgments ("You did a terrible thing!"), and directing
the client ("You have got to stop those sales!"). Under these circumstances, the
lawyer's primary concern should be influencing the client.
Of course, there are various levels of persuasion that the lawyer could use
between these two extremes. There are two factors that should influence the
level of intensity with which the lawyer engages the clients: the balance of
power between the lawyer and client and the danger that the actions being
considered pose to other people. When the determinants of power are primarily
on the lawyer's side, the lawyer should hesitate to exercise power over the client.
When the determinants are equal or primarily on the side of the client, the lawyer
is unlikely to overcome the client and can feel freer to express opinions about the
117. For additional discussion of the ways, and circumstances under which, a
lawyer might vary the intensity of moral discourse, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime,
Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons From Dostoyevsky, 35 HouS. L. REV.
327, 327-97 (1998).
118. SeeBallav. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 105 (I11. 1991).
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decisions that must be made. The lawyer's natural instincts are likely to be in
the opposite direction. The powerful lawyer (with weak clients) is likely to feel
comfortable asserting power; the weak lawyer (with powerful clients) is likely
to be hesitant to raise moral concerns and may fail to give the independent
advice that the client needs. If the lawyer is to involve the client in moral
discourse and not dominate the client, she may need to act against her instincts.
The powerful lawyer may need to work to respect the dignity of the weak client;
the weak lawyer may need courage to confront the powerful client. The second
factor is the danger to other people. When the client is considering engaging in
clear injustice, the lawyer should attempt to persuade the client to act justly.
There is, of course, the danger that the client will not want to take seriously
the interests of other people; he may want a hired gun or a godfather lawyer. If
the values of the lawyer and client are too different, it may be that there is no
potential for collaborative action. If the client wants the lawyer to take actions
that the lawyer believes are wrong, I believe that the lawyer should withdraw.
In cases in which serious injury is threatened to another person, as in the kidney
dialysis case, I believe that the lawyer should threaten to disclose the danger, and
if necessary, unilaterally disclose it."9 In the vast majority of cases, however,
I believe that the lawyer and client are likely to agree on a fair resolution of the
issues that they confront.
IV. CONCLUSION
William H. Simon is right about many things. Many lawyers have lost their
most important purpose, the pursuit ofjustice. Lawyers should seek justice in
light of all of the circumstances of each case. They cannot put on blinders and
assume that aggressive advocacy will yield justice. My argument is that lawyers
should involve clients in the pursuit of justice.
My concern is broader than the law office setting. We need as a culture to
begin to engage in moral discourse. Discussions about justice need to take place
in a wide range of contexts-in coffee shops, over neighborhood fences, and at
corporate board meetings. They also need to take place in law office encounters
between lawyers and clients. Simon's proposal that lawyers control decisions
in the law office based on "legal values" would inhibit and muddle that
discourse.
119. The legal profession's confidentiality rule provides no exception in such
circumstances. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1999).
However, I believe, as does Simon, that the lawyer should disclose confidential
information in order to protect someone from death or serious injury. See SIMON, supra
note 5, at 164. Even Monroe Freedman, one of the strongest proponents of the Dominant
View believes that disclosure would be justified. See FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 65.
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